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Abstract. We propose a framework for adaptive security from hard
random lattices in the standard model. Our approach borrows from the
recent Agrawal-Boneh-Boyen families of lattices, which can admit reliable
and punctured trapdoors, respectively used in reality and in simulation.
We extend this idea to make the simulation trapdoors cancel not for a
specific target but on a non-negligible subset of the possible challenges.
Conceptually, we build a compactly representable, large family of input-
dependent mixture lattices, set up with trapdoors that vanish for a
secret subset wherein we hope the attack occurs. Technically, we tweak
the lattice structure to achieve naturally nice distributions for arbitrary
choices of subset size. The framework is very general. Here we obtain fully
secure signatures, and also IBE, that are compact, simple, and elegant.
1 Introduction
Lattices are currently enjoying renewed interest in cryptography, owing to a
combination of mathematical elegance, implementation simplicity, provable se-
curity reductions, and, more recently, rather dramatic gains in efficiency that
bring them closer to the familiar discrete-log and factoring-based approaches.
Lattice-based crypto also offers the hope of withstanding quantum computers,
against which both discrete-log and factoring-based approaches are known to be
utterly defenseless. As a few examples of influential lattice-based cryptosystems
and foundations, we mention [5, 6, 17, 18, 4, 23, 22, 19], among many others.
Still, by far the biggest barrier to the practical deployment of lattice-based
cryptographic systems remains their space inefficiency, which may exceed by
several orders of magnitude that of the mainstream. This is especially true for
systems based on so-called hard random integer lattices, which have essentially
no structure other than being periodic modulo the same modulus q along every
coordinate axis. Hard lattices have the drawback of requiring voluminous repre-
sentations, especially when compared to lattices with additional structure such
as cyclic or ideal lattices. Being devoid of structure, however, hard lattices may
harbor potentially tougher hard problems for a safer foundation for crypto.
A primary motivation for lattice cryptography being a hedge against the
doomsday of mainstream assumptions, it seems worthwhile to endeavor to build
cryptosystems as efficient and provably secure as we can from hard lattices.
1.1 Related Work
A number of advances toward efficient lattice-based signatures have recently
been made. We mention a few that are most closely related to this work.
Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [16] gave an elegant near-linear-space one-time
signature on cyclic lattices, that could be lifted via a standard tree construction
into a many-time signature (in a stateful way, hence not hash-and-sign).
Gentry et al. [13] were the first to realize identity-based encryption from
(hard) lattices, with a fully secure construction that also gave a very efficient
signature as a by-product (albeit all of it only in the random-oracle model).
Cash et al. [11] and Peikert [21] then managed to remove the random oracle
and add a hierarchy, using an elegant but bandwidth-intensive bit-by-bit scheme
(also concurrently proposed by Agrawal and Boyen [3] sans hierarchy), reminis-
cent of Canetti et al. [10]. Additionally, Peikert [21] showed how the bit-by-bit
framework could yield a simpler signature (but not IBE, as it was salted), using
the recent prefix signature technique of Hohenberger and Waters [14].
Boneh et al. [9, 1] finally showed how to avoid the bit-by-bit IBE keys al-
together, in favor of a compact and efficient all-at-once encoding, creating a
selectively secure scheme reminiscent of Boneh and Boyen [8]. Though it did not
natively give a secure signature (a costly generic conversion would be needed),
we mention it because our framework turns it into a fully secure IBE and more.
Bandwidth Requirements The following table compares the space efficiency
of those recent signature schemes (in hard lattices, unless indicated otherwise).
S.I.S. Stand. State- |VerKey| |SigKey| |Signature|
strength β model? less? # in Zq # in Z # in Z
LM'08 [16] 7 cycl.lattic. 3 7 tree # in Z: O˜(λ)+O˜(`) O˜(`)
GPV'08 [13] O˜(n1.5) 7 r.o.m. 3 nm m2 m
CHK'09 [11] O˜(` n2) 3 3 2 `2+ nm m2 `2+m
P'09 [21] O˜(
√
` n1.5) 3 3 2 ` nm m2 `m
This work O˜(` n2.5) 3 3 ` nm m2 m
Parameter λ is the security level; ` the message bit-size; q the modulus; and m and n
the lattice and constraint dimensions where λ ≈ n < m = Θ(n log q). Tabulated SIS
strength is the approximation factor β incurred by the security reduction; and |entity|
the # of entries in Z and/or Zq per entity, with up to dlog qe ≈ dlog βe bits per entry.
We remark that moderate differences of approximation parameter (β) should
have limited practical impact compared to variations of number (#) of entries.
Indeed, β is linked to the modulus of Zq and the norm of entries in Z; and varying
their magnitudes by a factor z = `k1 nk2 = poly(q) only affects the information-
theoretic bit sizes by a factor 1+ log z/ log q = Θ(1). By contrast, if we vary the
number of entries by a factor z, the total bit sizes vary by a factor Θ(z). Note that
∀β = poly(n), there is an average-case β-SIS reduction [5] from worst-case SIVP
with approximation factors γ = O˜(β
√
n), widely believed hard ∀γ = poly(n).
The concrete parametric hardness of these assumptions is estimated in [12, 20].
1.2 Contribution
In this work, we propose a lattice-based encoding framework that generalizes the
all-at-once encoding of Agrawal et al. [1]. The relationship of this work to the
other one is akin to that linking Waters [24] to Boneh and Boyen [8] in pairing
groups. Our goal is to build compact, practical, and fully secure signatures and
identity-based encryption, from hard integer lattices in the standard model.
Here we focus on signatures. Our main construction is a stateless hash-and-
sign fully secure signature, i.e., existentially unforgeable under chosen-message
attacks, that is about as short as [13]. Our main result is a standard-model
security reduction for it and related schemes (from the classic average-case SIS
problem, itself reducible from worst-case SIVP and other hard problems [5, 23]).
As a bonus, our framework yields a clean unsalted construction that extends
effortlessly from signature to identity-based private-key extraction. The two are
indeed closely related, except that certain tricks used to make signatures secure
are incompatible with IBE, such as black-box randomized hashes whose nonces
would be inaccessible to a non-interactive encrypting party. Our framework does
not have this problem, and has already been used to make the IBE scheme of [1]
fully secure with little loss of efficiency (see the full version of [1] for details).
1.3 Highlights
Technically, we obtain our compact signature by mixing together, in a message-
dependent manner, a number of public-key matrices in order to induce in a
deterministic way a large family of hard lattices. A signature is a short non-zero
vector in the appropriate lattice. For proving adaptive security, we arrange the
lattice melange in such a way that a signing trapdoor, i.e., a short lattice basis,
is always available for every possible input in the real scheme. In the simulation,
faulty trapdoors will be made to vanish through spurious cancellations for a
certain, suitably sized set of challengeable inputs, unknown to the adversary.
A crucial and novel feature of our framework is to ensure that the challenge-
able inputs are well spread out over the entire input space, regardless of the
selected size of the challengeable set. This ensures that, regardless of the actions
of the adversary, the simulation will unfold with a significant and more or less
invariant probability of success. This simulation robustness property is unusual
and key to achieving an efficient security reduction.
Earlier schemes, also based on this principle of small but non-negligible chal-
lengeable input sets, generally did not have the luxury of uniform distributions
over custom domains; they had to provision complex mechanisms to compensate
for the non-uniformity of certain events in function of the adversary's actions.
The Waters [24] scheme, for example, contains such a mechanism, prompted by
the non-existence of distributions of non-negligible equal weights over exponen-
tially sized groups as used in pairing-based cryptography.
With lattices, by contrast, the possibility to work with smaller moduli gives
us an extra handle on the construction of nice distributions for a very wide
range of challengeable input set sizes. As a result, we obtain security reductions
that are simpler, tighter, and more efficient.
2 Lattice Notions
Here we gather a number of useful notions and results from the literature.
We denote by ‖A‖ or ‖a‖ the `2-norm of a matrix A or vector a. We denote
by A˜ the Gram-Schmidt ordered orthogonalization of A, and its `2-norm by ‖A˜‖.
2.1 Random Integer Lattices
Definition 1. Let a basis B =
[
b1
∣∣ . . . ∣∣ bm ] ∈ Rm×m be an m ×m matrix
with linearly independent columns b1, . . . ,bm ∈ Rm. The lattice Λ generated by
the basis B and its dual Λ∗ are defined as (both are m-dimensional),
Λ = L(B) =
{
y ∈ Rm s.t. ∃s ∈ Zm , y = B s =
m∑
i=1
si bi
}
Λ∗ =
{
z ∈ Rm s.t. ∀y ∈ Λ , zT y = 〈z,y〉 ∈ Z
}
Definition 2. For a positive integer q (later a prime) and a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq ,
define two m-dimensional full-rank integer lattices:
Λ⊥(A) =
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. A e = 0 (mod q)
}
Λ(A) =
{
y ∈ Zm s.t. ∃s ∈ Zn , AT s = y (mod q)
}
These are dual when properly scaled, as Λ⊥(A) = q Λ(A)∗ and Λ(A) = q Λ⊥(A)∗.
2.2 Bases and Trapdoors
A fundamental result in the geometry of numbers is that every lattice Λ has a
basis; e.g., see [15]. Implicit in its proof, is the well known fact that any full-rank
set SA ⊂ Λ can be converted into a basis TA for Λ with no greater orthogonalized
norm ‖T˜A‖ ≤ ‖S˜A‖.
Fact 3. For a set X = {x1, . . . ,xm} of lattice vectors, let X˜ = {x˜1, . . . , x˜m} be its
Gram-Schmidt ordered orthogonalization. There is a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that, on input an arbitrary basis of an m-dimensional lattice
Λ and a full-rank set S = {s1, . . . , sm} ⊂ Λ of lattice vectors, returns a basis
T = {t1, . . . , tm} of Λ such that ‖t˜i‖ ≤ ‖s˜i‖ for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Ajtai [6] shows how to sample a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an associ-
ated full-rank set SA ⊂ Λ⊥(A) of low-norm vectors orthogonal to A modulo q.
Tightness was later improved by Alwen and Peikert [7].
Proposition 4 ([7]). For any δ0 > 0, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that, on input a security parameter 1λ, an odd prime q = poly(λ),
and two integers n = Θ(λ) and m ≥ (5 + 3 δ0)n log q, outputs a statistically
(mq−δ0 n/2)-close to uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA ⊂ Λ⊥(A) such
that with overwhelming probability ‖TA‖ ≤ O(n log q) and ‖T˜A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q).
For the purpose of this paper, we take δ0 = 1/3, assume L = Ω˜(
√
m), and
summarize the foregoing as follows.
Fact 5. There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input a se-
curity parameter 1λ, an odd prime q = poly(λ), and two integers n = Θ(λ) and
m ≥ 6n log q, outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq statistically close to uniform, and a
basis TA for Λ
⊥(A) with overwhelming probability such that ‖T˜A‖ ≤ Θ˜(
√
m) ≤
L.
2.3 Discrete Gaussians
Given a basis for an integer random lattice, we recall how to sample random
lattice points from a discrete Gaussian distribution whose minimum width is
function of the norm of the lattice basis. We follow the works of [23, 4, 19, 13].
Definition 6. Letm ∈ Z>0 be a positive integer and Λ ⊂ Rm anm-dimensional
lattice. For any vector c ∈ Rm and any positive parameter σ ∈ R>0, we define:
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(
−pi ‖x−c‖2σ2
)
: a Gaussian-shaped function on Rm with center c
and parameter σ, (For x ∈ R, ρσ,c(x) ∝ N σ√
2pi
,0(x), the normal probability
density of variance σ
2
2pi and mean 0.)
ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρσ,c(x) : the (always converging) discrete integral of ρσ,c over
the lattice Λ,
DΛ,σ,c : the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter
σ,
∀y ∈ Λ , DΛ,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)
/
ρσ,c(Λ)
For notational convenience, origin-centered ρσ,0 and DΛ,σ,0 are abbreviated as
ρσ and DΛ,σ.
Gentry et al. [13] show that, given a basis B for a lattice Λ, one can efficiently
sample points in Λ with discrete Gaussian distribution for sufficiently large values
of σ.
Proposition 7 ([13]). There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that, on input an arbitrary basis B of an m-dimensional full-rank lattice Λ =
L(B), a parameter σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ω(√logm), and a center c ∈ Rm, outputs a sample
from a distribution that is statistically close to DΛ,σ,c.
For concreteness, we will refer to the algorithm of Proposition 7 as follows:
SampleGaussian(B, σ, c): On input a basis B for a lattice Λ ⊂ Rm, a positive
real parameter σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ω(√logm), and a center vector c ∈ Rm, it outputs
a fresh random lattice vector x ∈ Λ drawn from a distribution statistically
close to DΛ,σ,c.
2.4 Smoothing Parameter
We recall the notion of smoothing parameter of a lattice which lower-bounds
the density of points on a lattice across all directions, and how this relates to
discrete Gaussian sampling on the lattice.
Micciancio and Regev [19] define the smoothing parameter of a lattice as
follows.
Definition 8 ([19]). For any m-dimensional lattice Λ and any positive real
 > 0, the smoothing parameter η(Λ) is the smallest real η > 0 such that
ρ1/η(Λ∗ \ {0}) ≤ .
Micciancio and Regev [19] show that large deviations from lattice points
vanish exponentially.
Proposition 9 ([19]). For any lattice Λ of integer dimension m, any point c,
and any two reals  ∈ (0, 1) and η ≥ η(Λ),
Pr
{
x ∼ DΛ,η,c : ‖x− c‖ >
√
mη
}
≤ 1 + 
1−  2
−m
Peikert and Rosen [22] show that the Gaussian function itself vanishes away
from any point.
Proposition 10 ([22]). For any lattice Λ of integer dimension m, any center
c ∈ Rm, any two reals  ∈ (0, 1) and η ≥ 2 η(Λ), and any lattice point x ∈
span(Λ),
DΛ,η,c(x) ≤ 1 + 1−  2
−m
2.5 Statistical Mixing
We recall some useful statistical mixing properties relating to the reduction of
an integer vector modulo a lattice to yield a syndrome.
Ajtai [5] then Regev [23] show that binary combinations of enough vectors
alsmost always span the space.
Proposition 11 ([23]). Let m ≥ 2n log q. Then for all except at most some q−n
fraction of matrices A ∈ Zn×mq , the subset sums of the columns of A generate
Znq . In other words, for every syndrome u ∈ Zn there exists a binary vector
e ∈ {0, 1}m such that A e = u (mod q).
Gentry et al. [13] show that short Gaussian combinations of any spanning
vector set yields uniformity.
Proposition 12 ([13]). Assume the columns of A ∈ Zn×mq generate Znq , and
let  ∈ (0, 1) and η ≥ η(Λ⊥(A)). Then for e ∼ DZm,η the distribution of the
syndrome u = A e mod q is within statistical distance 2  of uniform over Znq .
Furthermore, fix u ∈ Znq and let c ∈ Zm be an arbitrary solution to A c = u
(mod q). Then the conditional distribution of e ∼ DZm,η given A e = u (mod q)
is exactly c+DΛ⊥(A),η,−c.
Gentry et al. [13] then show that for random A the lattice Λ(A) has large
minimal distance in `∞ and thus that Λ⊥(A) has small smoothing parameter.
Proposition 13 ([13]). Let q be a prime and n and m be two integers satisfying
m ≥ 2n log q. Then, for all but at most some q−n fraction of matrices A ∈
Zn×mq , it holds that λ∞1 (Λ(A)) ≥ q/4. Also, for any such A and any ω(
√
logm)
function, there is a negligible function (m) such that the smoothing parameter
η(Λ⊥(A)) ≤ ω(
√
logm).
Combining the previous propositions, Gentry et al. [13] summarize the results
as follows.
Fact 14. Fix a prime q and two integers n and m satisfying m ≥ 2n log q. For
all but at most 2 q−n of matrices A ∈ Zn×mq and for any Gaussian parameter η ≥
ω(
√
logm), on input e ∼ DZm,η the distribution of the syndrome u = A e mod q
is statistically close to uniform over Zn.
2.6 Preimage Sampling
We recall the notion of preimage-samplable functions (PSF) defined in [13],
which is based on the combination of a trapdoor construction for integer lattices
and an efficient discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm.
Let a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a low-norm basis TA for the lattice
Λ⊥(A). Used in the discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm, the short basis TA
can act as a trapdoor for finding small non-zero solutions e ∈ Zm of the equation
AT e = 0 (mod q) or more generally AT e = u (mod q) for any u ∈ Znq . This
leads to the notion of preimage-samplable functions [13].
We give the following definition of preimage-samplable function, following [13]:
Definition 15. Let λ, q, n, m, and L be as in Fact 5. Let σ ≥ Lω(√logm) be
some Gaussian parameter. A preimage-samplable function family is a collection
of maps fA : DZm,σ → Znq from DZm,σ = {e ∈ Zm : ‖e‖ ≤
√
mσ} ⊆ Zm into Znq ,
and specified by the following four algorithms:
TrapGen(1λ): On input 1λ, it uses the algorithm of Fact 5 to obtain a pair
(A,TA), where A ∈ Zn×mq is statistically close to uniform and TA ⊂ λ⊥(A)
is a short basis with ‖T˜‖ ≤ L. The public function parameters are (A, q).
The preimage-sampling trapdoor is the basis TA.
EvalFun(A, q, e): On input function parameters (A, q) and an input point e ∈
DZm,σ, it outputs the image fA(e) = A e mod q in Znq . (The output is unde-
fined on large input e ∈ Zm \ DZm,σ.)
SampleDom(1(m), σ): On input the m×m identity matrix 1(m) and a Gaussian
parameter σ, it outputs e ← SampleGaussian(1(m), σ,0), i.e., outputs an
element e ∈ Zm such that e ∼ DZm,σ. The input matrix 1(m) conveys the
dimensionm and its columns give a basis for Gaussian sampling in the lattice
Zm. By Proposition 10, with overwhelming probability e ∈ DZm,σ.
SamplePre(A, q, TA, σ,u): On input function parameters A and q and a trap-
door TA, a Gaussian parameter σ as above, and a target image u ∈ Znq ,
it samples a preimage e ∈ DZm,σ from the distribution DZm,σ conditioned
on the event that A e = u (mod q). To do this, it solves for an arbitrary
solution c ∈ Zm in the linear system A c = u (mod q); it then samples
d← SampleGaussian(TA, σ,−c) ∼ DΛ⊥(A),σ,−c and outputs e = c+d in Zm.
By Proposition 10, with overwhelming probability e ∈ DZm,σ.
The construction is correct and efficient by Proposition 12; see [13] for details.
2.7 Elementary Delegation
There are several ways to delegate a short basis for Λ⊥(A) into one for Λ⊥([A|B]).
If there is no one-wayness requirement on the delegation process, then Peik-
ert [21] describes a very effective elementary deterministic way to do this.
Proposition 16 ([21]). Take any matrix A ∈ Zn×m1q such that the columns
of A span the group Znq . Let an arbitrary B ∈ Zn×m2q , and define F = [A|B].
There exists a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm that, given A, B, and an
arbitrary basis TA for Λ
⊥(A), outputs a basis TF for Λ⊥(F) while preserving the
Gram-Schmidt norm of the basis (i.e., such that ‖T˜F ‖ = ‖T˜A‖).
2.8 Hardness Assumption
The following lattice problem was first suggested to be hard on average by Aj-
tai [5] and formally defined by Micciancio and Regev [19].
Definition 17. The Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem in L2-norm is: given
an integer q, a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a real β, find a non-zero integer vector
e ∈ Zm such that A e = 0 (mod q) and ‖e‖2 ≤ β. The average-case (q, n,m, β)-
SIS problem is defined similarly, where A is uniformly random.
This problem was shown to be as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems,
first by Ajtai [5], then by Micciancio and Regev [19], and Gentry et al. [13].
Proposition 18 ([13]). For any poly-bounded m, any β = poly(n) and for any
prime q ≥ β ·ω(√n log n), the average-case (q, n,m, β)-SIS problems is as hard as
approximating the Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP), among others,
in the worst case to within certain γ = β · O˜(√n) factors.
2.9 More Useful Facts
Lemma 19. Let B0 ∈ Zn×mq . Let H be a scalar h ∈ Zq or a matrix H ∈ Zn×nq .
Suppose that H is invertible modulo q (i.e., |H| 6= 0 (mod q) when q is prime).
Then, the two preimage-samplable functions (B0)(·) mod q and (H B0)(·) mod q
from Zm into Znq admit exactly the same trapdoors TB0 ⊂ Zm.
Proof. For all e ∈ Zm we have B0 e = 0 (mod q) if and only if H B0 e = 0
(mod q), hence the two lattices Λ⊥(B0) and Λ⊥(H B0) are the same. Thus, TB0 ⊂
Λ⊥(B0)⇔ TB0 ⊂ Λ⊥(H B0).
3 General Simulation Framework
We now describe the core scheme. At a high level, we achieve short signatures
with full adaptive security by providing a relatively large number of public-
key matrices, which are then mixed through together in a message-dependent
manner  as opposed to merely juxtaposed as in the constructions of [3, 11, 21].
In the simulation, the public-key matrices will hide a trapdoor component that
has a non-negligible probability of vanishing in the mix for certain unpredictable
choices of messages: on those messages the simulator will be unable to answer
signature queries, but will be able instead to exploit an existential forgery.
Our key-mixing technique is at some level reminiscent of Waters' scheme [24]
in bilinear groups, but with a number of crucial differences. The farther-reaching
difference is that in the lattice setting we can exploit the smaller groups and
their richer structure to create a (much) more efficient mixing effect than in
the large cyclic groups of the discrete-log setting. Another difference concerns
randomization, which in a lattice setting tends to be rather more involved than
in discrete-log settings; our approach is based on the method of randomization
by a low-norm matrix from [1], with the small added contribution to show that
it can be done in a way that supports the mixing effect that we need.
3.1 Two-Sided Trapdoors
To facilitate the description of the scheme and its proof, we first construct a
preimage-samplable function of a special form that will be able to sample short
preimages from the same distribution, using either one of two types of trapdoors:
firm trapdoors will be used in the real scheme, and will never fail to work;
fickle trapdoors will be used in the simulation, and will be fragile by design.
Lattices with dual trapdoors were first introduced in [9, 1]. Here, we seek to
let the matrix R, below, be generated as a mixture of certain low-norm matrices.
All the algorithms in this subsection are adapted from  4 of [1].
Definition 20. Consider an algorithm TwoSideGen(1λ) that outputs two ran-
dom matrices A ∈ Zn×mq and R ∈ Zm×m, where A is uniform and R has some
distribution R. Let B ∈ Zn×mq be an independent third matrix. Write AR as
shorthand for (AR mod q) ∈ Zn×mq , and define,
F =
[
A
∣∣ AR+ B] ∈ Zn×2mq
We say that the pair (F, q) defines the public parameters of a two-sided function.
The following lemmas show that a two-sided function (F, q) is a preimage-
samplable function given a trapdoor for either A or B, provided that A and R
are drawn from suitable distributions.
Lemma 21. For any parameter η ≥ ω(√logm), there exists an efficiently
samplable distribution Rη over Zm×m, such that with overwhelming probabil-
ity R =
∑`
i=1 for independent Ri ∼ Rη has norm ‖R‖ ≤
√
mη, and such that
for (A,R) ∼ UZn×mq ×R and fixed B ∈ Zn×mq the matrix F = [A|AR+B] ∈ Zn×2mq
is statistically close to uniform.
Proof. According to Fact 14, it suffices to pick the columns of R independently
wiht ∼ DZm,η.
Lemma 22 (Firm trapdoor). Let L and σ be as in Definition 15 and Rη as in
Lemma 21. If [A|B] ∼ UZn×2mq and TA ⊂ Λ⊥(A) of norm ‖T˜A‖ ≤ L, then the pair(
F = [A|B], q) is a preimage-samplable function in the sense of Definition 15.
Proof. Per Lemma 21, F is statistically close to uniform in Zn×2mq , thus F has
the right distribution. It remains to show how to perform public and trapdoor
sampling.
SampleDom. To sample short vectors e ∼ DZ2m,σ in the domain of F, one
proceeds exactly as in the GPV scheme, i.e., by executing SampleDom(1(2m), σ)
which does not require any trapdoor.
SamplePre. For preimage sampling, we show how to sample a short preimage
e ∈ Z2m of any u ∈ Znq with conditional distribution DZ2m,σ | F e = u (mod q).
Since a random A ∈ Zn×mq will almost always span all of Znq , we can use the
deterministic delegation mechanism of Proposition 16 to obtain a basis TF for
F with short Gram-Schmidt norm ‖T˜F ‖ ≤ L. Having such a trapdoor TF for F,
we invoke SamplePre(F, q,TF , σ,u) to obtain a short random preimage e.
Lemma 23 (Fickle trapdoor). Let L be as in Definition 15, η as in Lemma 21,
and σ = L′ ω(
√
logm) where L′ = 2 η σ′
√
m and where σ′ ≥ L√`mω(√logm).
Fix a matrix B ∈ Zn×mq with a short basis TB of orthogonalized norm ‖T˜B‖ ≤ L.
For (A,R) such that [A|AR] ∼ UZn×2mq and ‖R‖ ≤ η
√
`m, the pair
(
F = [A|AR+
B], q
)
is a preimage-samplable function in the sense of Definition 15.
In this lemma, we allow ‖R‖ ≤ η√`m, where the factor √` will account for
the fact that in the simulation the matrix R = Rmsg =
∑`
i=1±Ri for independent
Ri of norm ‖Ri‖ ≤ η
√
m and coefficients ±1 function of the message msg.
Proof. Per Lemma 21, F is statistically close to uniform in Zn×2mq , thus F has
the right distribution. We need to show how to perform public and trapdoor
sampling.
SampleDom. Sampling short vectors e ∼ DZ2m,σ is done without any trapdoor
by invoking SampleDom(1(2m), σ), as in the previous lemma.
SamplePre. For preimage sampling, we need to show, given any input u ∈ Znq ,
how to sample a short preimage e ∈ Z2m of u with conditional distribution
DZ2m,σ | F e = u (mod q). We do this in three steps:
1. We build a full-rank set SF ⊂ Λ⊥(F) such that ‖S˜F ‖ ≤ 2 η L
√
`mω(
√
logm).
This is done by independently sampling short vectors ei ∈ Λ⊥(F) until a linearly
independent set of 2m such vectors is found. To sample one short vector e ∈
Λ⊥(F) given the trapdoor TB , we compute d1 ← SampleDom(1(m), (η
√
`−1)σ′)
and d2 ← SamplePre(B, q,TB , σ′,−Ad1), and define,
d =
[
d1
d2
]
∈ Z2m e =
[
d1 − Rd2
d2
]
∈ Z2m
Observe that e is a fixed invertible linear function of d, and that d is discrete
Gaussian by construction. A result of Regev [23] shows that, with overwhelming
probability, at most 4m2 samples will be needed to get 2m linearly independent
vectors d, and therefore also 2m linearly independent vectors e. For each e,
we have F e = A (d1−Rd2)+(AR+B)d2 = Ad1+Bd2 = Ad1−Ad1 = 0 ∈ Znq ,
hence e ∈ Λ⊥(F). We have also ‖e‖ ≤ (η√`− 1)σ′√m+ η σ′m√`+ σ′√m ≤
2 η σ′m
√
`. Thus by assembling 2m linearly independent such vectors e, we
obtain a full-rank set SF ⊂ Λ⊥(F) of orthogonalized norm ‖S˜F ‖ ≤ 2 η σ′m
√
`.
2. We convert the short set SF into an equally short basis TF , i.e., such that
‖T˜F ‖ ≤ ‖S˜F ‖. We can do this efficiently using the algorithm of Fact 3, starting
from an arbitrary basis for Λ⊥(F), itself easy to construct by linear algebra.
3. We use the newly constructed basis TF to sample a short preimage e of
the given target u ∈ Znq , using e ← SamplePre(F, q,TF , σ,u). Notice that the
Gaussian parameter σ ≥ ‖T˜F ‖ω(
√
logm), so the algorithm SamplePre can be
applied with the stated parameters, and hence e sampled in this manner will
have conditional distribution e ∼ DZ2m,σ | F e = u (mod q).
Remark 24. Agrawal et al. [2] show the sampling overhead is only a factor ≤ 2,
hence in Step 1 we need to sample at most 4m vectors e on expectation.
We also mention that a lower-norm fickle trapdoor may be obtained by using
the Alwen-Peikert delegation method as in Lemma 22 instead of the repeated
sampling as above. We revisit this issue in the full paper.
The point of the two-sided preimage-samplable function is that in the actual
scheme we use the firm preimage mechanism with an always-available trapdoor
TA, whereas in the simulation we use the fickle preimage mechanism TB for a
matrix B = hmsg B0 that sometimes vanishes.
3.2 Main Signature Scheme
The following is our core construction of a fully secure short signature. It is very
simple and already achieves most of the compactness benefits while illustrating
the framework. In the full paper, we show how to squeeze out some additional
factor from the signature size, albeit at the cost of a more complex system.
From now on, a message msg is an `-bit string
(
msg[1], . . . ,msg[`]
) ∈ {0, 1}`
indexed from 1 to `, augmented with a 0-th dummy extra bit set to msg[0] = 0.
This will let us easily include a constant term of index 0 in various summations.
KeyGen(1λ): On input a security parameter λ in unary, do these steps:
1. Draw an n-by-m matrix A0 ∈ Zn×mq with a short basis TA0 ⊂ Λ⊥(A0).
 Do so by invoking TrapGen(1λ), resulting in TA0 such that ‖T˜A0‖ ≤ L.
2. Draw `+ 1 independent n-by-m-matrices C0, . . . ,C` ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Output the signing and verification keys,
SK =
(
TA0
) ∈ Zm×m VK = (A0, C0, . . . ,C`) ∈ (Zn×mq )`+2
Sign(SK,msg): On input a signing key SK and a message msg ∈ {0} × {0, 1}`:
1. Define the n-by-m-matrix Cmsg =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg[i] Ci.
2. Define the message-dependent matrix Fmsg =
[
A0
∣∣ Cmsg] ∈ Zn×2mq .
3. Sample a short non-zero random point d ∈ Λ⊥(Fmsg), using SK = TA0 .
 Do so by sampling d ∼ DZ2m,σ | Fmsg d = 0, using Lemma 22.
4. Output the digital signature,
sigmsg =
(
d
) ∈ Z2m
Verify(VK,msg, sigmsg): On input a verification key VK, a message msg, and a
signature sigmsg:
1. Check that the message msg is well formed in {0} × {0, 1}`.
2. Check that the signature sigmsg is a small but non-zero vector.
 Do so by verifying that sigmsg = d ∈ Z2m and 0 < ‖d‖ ≤
√
2m · σ.
3. Check that sigmsg is a point on the mixed lattice specified by msg.
 Do so by verifying that
[
A0
∣∣∣ ∑`
i=0
(−1)msg[i] Ci
]
d = 0 (mod q)
4. If all the verifications pass, accept the signature; otherwise, reject.
3.3 Security Reduction
It is easy to see by inspection that the signature scheme is consistent with over-
whelming probability.
The next theorem reduces the SIS problem to the existential forgery of our
signature. The proof involves a moderate polynomial SIS parameter β. The ex-
pression of β arises in Lemma 26, but otherwise passes through the reduction.
In  3.4, we revisit the question of the lattice parameters in greater detail.
Theorem 25. For a prime modulus q = q(λ), if there is a probabilistic algorithm
A that outputs an existential signature forgery, with probability , in time τ , and
making Q ≤ q/2 adaptive chosen-message queries, then there is a probabilistic
algorithm B that solves the (q, n,m, β)-SIS problem in time τ ′ ≈ τ and with
probability ′ ≥ /(3 q), for some polynomial function β = poly(λ).
Proof. Suppose that there exists such a forger A. We construct a solver B that
simulates an attack environment and uses the forgery to create its solution. The
various operations performed by B are the following.
Invocation. B is invoked on a random instance of the (q, n,m, β)-SIS problem,
and is asked to return an admissible solution.
 Supplied: an n-by-m-matrix A0 ∈ Zn×mq from the uniform distribution.
 Requested: any e0 ∈ Zm such that A0 e0 = 0 (mod q) and 0 6= ‖e0‖ ≤ β.
Setup. B gives to the adversary A a simulated verification key constructed as
follows:
1. Pick a random matrix B0 ∈ Zn×mq with a short basis TB0 ⊂ Λ⊥(B0).
 Do so by invoking TrapGen(1λ), resulting in TB0 such that ‖T˜B0‖ ≤ L.
2. Pick `+ 1 short random square m-by-m-matrices R0, . . . ,R` ∈ Zm×m.
 Do so by independently sampling the columns of the Ri ∼ DZm,η.
3. Pick ` uniformly random scalars h1, . . . , h` ∈ Zq and fix h0 = 1 ∈ Zq.
4. Output the verification key VK =
(
A0, C0 = (A0 R0 + h0 B0) mod q,
C1 = (A0 R1 + h1 B0) mod q, . . . , C` = (A0 R` + h` B0) mod q
)
.
Queries. B answers adaptive signature queries from A on any message msg as
follows:
1. Compute the matrix Rmsg =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg[i] Ri.
2. Compute the scalar hmsg =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg[i] hi.
3. If hmsg = 0 (mod q), abort the simulation.
4. Compute the matrix Fmsg =
[
A0
∣∣ A0 Rmsg + hmsg B0] ∈ Zn×2mq .
5. Find a short random d ∈ Λ⊥(Fmsg) ⊂ Z2m, using the trapdoor TB0 .
 Do so by sampling d ∼ DZ2m,σ given Fmsg d = 0, using the procedure of
Lemma 23, using TB0 as short basis for Λ
⊥(hmsg B0) per Lemma 19.
6. Output the digital signature sigmsg = d ∈ Z2m.
Forgery. B receives from A a forged signature d∗ on a new (unqueried) message
msg∗, and does:
1. Compute the matrix R∗ =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg
∗[i] Ri.
2. Compute the scalar h∗ =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg
∗[i] hi.
3. If h∗ 6= 0 (mod q), abort the simulation.
4. Separate d∗T into
[
d∗1
T ∣∣ d∗2T ].
5. Return e0 = d∗1 + R
∗ d∗2 ∈ Zm as solution to A0 e0 = 0 (mod q).
Lemma 26 shows that the answer e0 will be with small and non-zero with
good probability, and thus a valid (q, n,m, β)-SIS solution for the stated
approximation β. (An instantiation of β is given in  3.4.)
Outcome. The reduction is valid provided that B can complete the simulation
(without aborting) with a substantial probability that is independent of the
view of A and the choices it makes. The completion probability for B against
an arbitrary strategy for A is quantified in Lemma 27.
It follows from the bounds of Lemmas 26 and 27, under the assumption that
Q ≤ q/2, that if A existentially forges a signature with probability , then B
solves the SIS instance with probability,
′ ≥ pi0
(
1− q−1Q) q−1  ≥ pi0 /2 q ≥ /3 q for pi0 ≥ 2/3
With the stated lemmas, this concludes the security reduction.
Lemma 26. Given a valid forgery
[
d
∗
1
T | d∗2T
]
from A on some msg∗ such that
hmsg∗ = 0 (mod q), the vector e0 = d∗1 + Rmsg∗ d
∗
2 ∈ Zm is with high probability
pi0 = Θ(1) ≥ 2/3 a short non-zero preimage of 0 under A0, namely, e0 ∈ Λ⊥(A0)
and 0 6= ‖e0‖ ≤ β for some polynomial function β = poly(`, n,m) = poly(λ).
Sketch. Let h∗ = hmsg∗ and R∗ = Rmsg∗ . Let C∗ = Cmsg∗ =
∑`
i=0 (−1)msg
∗[i] Ci.
First, when h∗ = 0, we have C∗ = A0 R∗+h∗ B0 = A0 R∗, and thus for a valid
signature forgery d∗,
A0 e0 = A0
(
d∗1+R
∗ d∗2
)
=
[
A0
∣∣ A0 R∗] [d∗1d∗2
]
=
[
A0
∣∣ C∗]d∗ = 0 (mod q)
Next, we show that e0 is suitably short, which is true since R
∗ is a sum of
` + 1 low-norm matrices Ri with coefficients ±1, where the summands are all
short discrete Gaussian by construction of R0, . . . ,R`. Since the matrices ±Ri
are nearly independent1 with the same variance V
{±Ri} = V{R1}, we have,
V
{
R∗
}
= V
{∑`
i=0
±Ri
} ≈ ∑`
i=0
V
{±Ri} = ∑`
i=0
V
{
Ri
}
= (`+ 1) ·V{R1}
Since the ±Ri closely approximate real normal Gaussian variables, so does R∗
and therefore the Gaussian vanishing tail inequalities apply. Especially, as they
are almost independent discrete Gaussian with center 0 and parameter η, and
thus E
{
R∗
} ≈ E{Ri} = 0, we have Pr{‖ ± Ri‖ > √mη} = negl(m); and thus,1
Pr
{‖R∗‖ > √`+ 1 · √mη} ≤ Pr{‖R1‖ > √mη} = negl(m)
Hence with overwhelming probability ‖e0‖ ≤ β for β = poly(`, n,m) = poly(λ),
provided we set,1
β =
(
1 +
√
`+ 1
√
mη
)√
2mσ
Finally, it remains to show that e0 = d∗1+Rmsg∗ d
∗
2 6= 0. Suppose for an easy
case that d∗2 = 0; then for a valid forgery we must have d
∗
1 6= 0 and thus e0 6= 0.
Suppose on the contrary that d∗2 6= 0. In that case, 0 6= ‖d∗2‖ <
√
2mσ  q;
and thus there must be at least one coordinate of d∗2 that is non-zero modulo q.
W.l.o.g., let this coordinate be the last one in d∗2, and call it y. Let r
∗ be the last
column of R∗, and let ri the last column of Ri for each i. As R∗ =
∑
(−1)msg[i]Ri,
we have r∗ =
∑
(−1)msg[i]ri, where the coefficients ±1 depend on the message
bits. We focus on r1: the last column of the matrix R1 associated with the first
message bit msg[1]. Let v = (−1)msg[1] y r1. The expression of e0 can be rewritten
e0 = y r∗ + e′0 = v+ e
′′
0 , where v depends on r1 and e
′′
0 does not.
The last step is to observe that the only information about r1 available to A
is contained in the last column of C1 (with pollution h1 B0, known in the worst
case). By leftover hash or a simple pigeonhole principle, there are a very large
(exponential in m − n log q) number of admissible and equally likely vectors r1
that are compatible with the view of A, and in particular more than six of them.
Since A can set the bit msg[1] in one of two ways, it follows that A cannot know
the value of v with probability exceeding one third. At most one such value can
result in a cancellation of e0, for if some v caused all coordinates of e0 to cancel,
then every other v would fail to do so. We deduce that pi0 = Pr{e0 6= 0} ≥ 2/3.
(In fact, we have pi0 > 1− exp(−Ω(m− n log q))→ 1 as λ→∞.)
1 Without using near independence, we can show Pr{‖R∗‖ > (`+1)·√mη} = negl(m),
and accordingly set β =
`
1 + (`+ 1)
√
mη
´√
2mσ, which is a factor ≈ √` worse.
Lemma 27. For a prime modulus q = q(λ) and a number of queries Q ≥ 0,
the simulation completes both the Queries and Forgery phases without aborting,
with probability,
1
q
(
1− Q
q
)
≤ Pr{completion} ≤ 1
q
In particular, for Q ≤ q/2, this probability is Pr{completion} ∈ [q−1/2, q−1]
regardless of the adversary's strategy.
Intuitively, we first observe that provided B does not abort, then the simula-
tion is (almost) perfect in the sense that the view of A has the same distribution
as in an attack against the real scheme (modulo a negligible sampling error owing
to the imperfection of TrapGen). In particular, A's view remains independent of
B's choice of h1, . . . , h`, simply because those values have no counterpart in an
actual attack environment.
Now, the adversary can always assume that it is facing a simulator instead
of a real challenger, and accordingly attempt to derail the simulation. Since the
necessity to abort, for a given adversarial strategy, hinges entirely on B's secret
choice of random h1, . . . , h`, it suffices to show that these values remain mostly
unlearnable no matter A's attack strategy.
To show this, we consider a hypothetical unbounded perfect adversary A and
show that, even with perfect Bayesian updating upon each new adaptive query
it makes, such adversary is unable to infer enough information about h1, . . . , h`
to affect significantly the success probability of the simulation.
Proof. Consider the `-dimensional space Z`q, which is the domain of the unknown
(h1, . . . , h`), and recall that h0 = 1. Denote by Hj the distribution of (h1, . . . , h`)
over Z`q as perceived by the adversary after the first j signature queries have
been answered without aborting.
At the start of the attack, since the simulator's selection of (h1, . . . , h`) is a
uniformly random point in Z`q, the adversary's prior distributionH0 is necessarily
the uniform distribution U(Z`q) over Z`q. For every query message msgj that is
answered without aborting, A can prune from the support of H every point
(h1, . . . , h`) that lies on the incompatible hyperplane hmsgj = 0 (mod q).
Denote by Vj the hyperplane thus eliminated after a successful j-th query.
Suppose by induction that Hj−1 = U(W), a uniform distribution over some
support set W ⊆ Z`q. By conditioning Hj−1 on the new evidence gained at the
j-th query, namely that (h1, . . . , h`) 6∈ Vj , one obtains an updated or posterior
distribution Hj = U(W\Vj), which is uniform over the smaller support set given
by W \ Vj . By induction on the number of queries, starting from H0 = U(Z`q),
we deduce that, after the j-th query, Hj = U(Z`q \ ∪ji=1Vi).
In particular, after all Q allowed queries have been made, the fully updated
posterior distribution HQ in the view of the adversary is then,
HQ = U
(
Z`q \ ∪Qi=1Vi
)
In other words, this shows that, in the event that B was able to answer all the
queries, the unknown vector (h1, . . . , h`) remains equally likely to lie anywhere
in all of Z`q outside of the Q query-dependent hyperplanes V1, . . . ,VQ. Being the
result of perfect Bayesian updating from all available observations, this distri-
bution captures all the information about (h1, . . . , h`) leaked by B to A during
the Queries phase.
To complete the argument, consider the hyperplane V∗ ⊂ Z`q defined by
the scalar equation hmsg∗ = 0 (mod q) corresponding to the forgery message
msg∗ chosen by the adversary. By the requirements of what constitutes a valid
existential forgery, we know that msg∗ 6= msgj and thus V∗ 6= Vj for all j.
(Indeed, the purpose of adding a fixed dummy message bit msg[0] and setting
h0 = 1 6= 0 is to ensure that any two distinct messages msgj 6= msg∗ ∈ {0, 1}`
always induce distinct hyperplaces Vj 6= V∗ ⊂ Z`q.)
Since V∗ and Vj are distinct affine subspaces of dimension ` − 1 in Z`q, we
have
∣∣V∗ ∩ Vj∣∣ ≤ q`−2 whereas ∣∣V∗∣∣ = ∣∣Vj∣∣ = q`−1 and of course ∣∣Z`q∣∣ = q`.
Consequently, V∗ and Vj have at most a fraction 1/q of their points in common,
and more specifically
∣∣V∗ \ Vj∣∣ ≥ (1− q−1) ∣∣V∗∣∣ = (1− q−1) q−1 ∣∣Z`q∣∣ for all j.
Considering the event completion = ∧Qi=1
{
(h1, . . . , h`) ∈ (V∗ \ Vi)
}
and in-
voking the union bound on this conjunction, we thus establish a lower bound,
Pr
{
completion
}
= Pr
{
(h1, . . . , h`) ∈ (V∗ \ ∪Qi=1Vi)
}
≥ (1− q−1Q) Pr{(h1, . . . , h`) ∈ V∗} = (1− q−1Q) q−1
Conversely, we can trivially establish an upper bound,
Pr
{
completion
}
= Pr
{
(h1, . . . , h`) ∈ (V∗ \ ∪Qi=1Vi)
}
≤ Pr{(h1, . . . , h`) ∈ V∗} = ∣∣V∗∣∣ / ∣∣Z`q∣∣ = q−1
In both cases the probability is over the simulator's initial choice of h1, . . . , h`.
We have shown that the probability of completion without aborting is bounded
in the narrow range
[
(1−q−1Q) q−1, q−1], regardless of the adversary's actions.
The lemma follows.
3.4 Lattice Parameters
It is not so obvious to see that the various parameters can be instantiated in a way
that satisfies the flurry of constraints and inequalities evoked in  2 and  3.3. This
is necessary for us, later, to prove the security of the signature from a polynomial
average-case SIS that reduces to a worst-case lattice hardness assumption.
Example 28. To ensure that hard lattices with good short bases can be generated
(i.e.,m ≥ 6n log q), that our flavor of SIS has a worst-case lattice reduction (i.e.,
q ≥ β · ω(√n log n)), that the two-sided trapdoors can operate smooothly (i.e.,
σ sufficiently large), that vectors sampled using a trapdoor are difficult SIS
solutions (i.e., β ≥ √2 `mη σ), etc., in function of a security parameter λ: we
may choose a function ω(
√
logm), a constant δ1 > 0, and a threshold λ0  0;
and ∀λ > λ0 may set:
n = λ
m = n1+δ1
η = ω(
√
logm)
L =
√
mω(
√
logm)
σ =
√
`m3/2 ω(
√
logm)4
β =
√
2 `m5/2 ω(
√
logm)5
q =
√
2 `m3 ω(
√
logm)6
One must however keep in mind that the security reduction given in Theorem 25
holds only if q ≥ 2Q, so it may be necessary to increase q and the other param-
eters beyond the baseline values listed above. We avoid this in  3.5.
3.5 Refined Simulation Framework
In the full paper, we give a refined analysis of such schemes that lets us retain
the baseline q even for very large Q. The idea is to replace the random scalars
hi ∈ Zq by block-diagonal matrices Hi ∈ Zn×nq consisting of a repeated random
submatrix drawn from a full-rank difference group G ⊂ Zk×kq for a special k|n,
where any difference G1−G2 ∈ G is either zero or an invertible matrix in Zk×kq .
Visually, a random input k-vector ∈ Zkq is mapped to a random matrix Hi using
an encoding map µ built from an FRD encoding ϕ, according to this picture,
µ : Zkq → Zn×nq : v 7→

ϕ(v) 0
ϕ(v)
}
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
. . .
0 ϕ(v)

Full-rank difference (FRD) families in Zn×nq were used as a plentiful IBE
encoding [1] able to represent as many as possible distinct identities, up to qn.
Here, FRD families serve a very different purpose, internal to the simulator.
They let us swap the mixing scalars hi for uniform matrices Hi in a custom
group, whose size qk can be tuned just right to the query allowance Q without
also raising the modulus q. The benefit: smaller moduli make signatures smaller
and faster, and security tighter. Remarkably, except for the relaxation on q, the
actual scheme is unchanged. The theorem below is proven in the full paper.
Theorem 29. If there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that creates an existen-
tial signature forgery, in time τ , with probability , making Q adaptive chosen-
message queries, then there exists a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the SIS
problem of Theorem 25 in time τ ′ ≈ τ with probability ′ ≥ /(6 q Q).
Since both versions of the framework apply to the same scheme, we can pick
q obliviously of Q, and invoke Theorem 25 if Q ≤ q/2 or Theorem 29 if Q q.
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